It's understandable to be concerned that a new, untested license might present unforeseen consequences. To be fair to businesses submitting their patents, it's important to look at possible failure modes of the OPL, and make sure they don't present a problem for early adopters.

First, it could fail to succeed in its goal of solving most of the problems related to (software) patents. That wouldn't be such a big problem really: If for some unknown reason the license simply doesn't work out as expected and that's the only problem, we would simply be back to the status quo--it's not a desirable situation, but we haven't actually lost ground.

The failure mode that has to be avoided is that of companies submitting their patents under the OPL, and then later finding out that they have potentially destroyed their company by having done so. Even finding that they've lost the defensive benefits of their patent portfolio would be terrible. The fundamental problem is that no matter how much the OPL is reviewed before version 1.0, that version could still contain mistakes, or present unforeseen problems, once companies actually begin agreeing to the license.

No one wants to bet their company's future on an untested cross-licensing agreement, but a cross-licensing agreement that no one participates in is useless. It's a catch-22.

The solution is to have an escape clause in the license. For some number of months after the release of version 1.0, anyone can withdraw from the agreement completely, removing their patents from the various pools, and removing their rights to use other patents in those pools. That way, everyone can safely participate even during the very time the participants will be most concerned about unforeseen problems.

But once the OPL has worked for a few months and has proved itself workable, then continuing to retain that escape clause would simply be unfair and dishonest to the other participants. Companies will have come to base their product plans on the fact that they can incorporate patents from the various pools. It's not fair for companies to permanently be at the mercy of others who may destroy these planed products by removing patents from OPL pools on a whim, so three months after OPL version 1.0, the escape clause time will be reduced from three months to 10 days.

That will give time for problems in the OPL to have shown up, and by that time people will have started depending on the OPL. Then the concern about whether it's a good idea for a particular company to participate or not will have changed from a concern about whether the OPL has unforeseen advantages and disadvantages, to a concern that patents not be mistakenly submitted. Those latter mistakes can presumably be found within 10 days of submitting patents, but finding out about former mistakes can take months.

The license is designed to allow for enough time for both types of mistakes to be corrected, while still being fair to those who remain participants.

Patents are fundamentally monopolistic to begin with. This is an agreement to not act monopolistic with anyone who agrees to the same thing. This isn't an exclusive deal between major players attempting to corner a market: Anyone can agree to the OPL, whether they own patents or not.

The only requirement to obtain the benefits of the use of the patents submitted is that you abandon your patent monopolies at least to the extent that the licensor of those patents did.

My vague understanding, and I would appreciate any feedback from lawyers, or anyone who knows about the issue in more depth, is that the US Justice Department tends to take a dim view of patent cross-licensing when it is used to maintain a monopoly. The purpose of the OPL is basically to break an unfair and harmful monopoly of certain types of IP, so I don't think antitrust problems will be a large concern. But again, I would welcome more detailed info or pointers on the subject. -Mark

The mere fact that you have licensed your patents under the OPL, (such that others can use your patents only if they similarly license their patents), won't enable infringers of your patents to successfully use a misuse defense in the US. Or, at least that's my interpretation of 35 USC 271(d). (I would welcome comments from lawyers on the subject, both as an answer to this question, and to make sure the OPL doesn't cause patent submitters to inadvertently be misusing their patents.)

Here is the text of 35 USC 271(d):

(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.

The New York Law Journal has a good article on the subject.

Patents are irrevocably submitted to the various pools, (except for the previously mentioned exceptions.) If a company is bought out by another that forces them to withdraw from the agreement, those patents will remain in the pools.

(Have to have lawyers verify that the wording of the license is sufficient to make the licensing irrevocable worldwide after the escape-clause timeouts, but that's the intent.)